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ABSTRACT

This booklet offers a perspective on U.S. foreign policy for election year 1980. It can be used as a discussion starter at the secondary and college levels. Long range goals essential to a warless world are proposed. They are: mediating regional and national crises; gaining arms control and disarmament agreements; strengthening international institutions; building a sense of world community; and sustaining world economic development. Specific proposals designed to initiate progress toward reaching these goals are then presented and discussed. For example, to sustain world economic development, the United States should (1) reduce oil imports further; (2) establish a standardized accounting system for aid transfers, including governmental and nongovernmental aid; and (3) appropriate or ear mark 1/2 of the needed funds for a country's land reform program provided the land goes to those tilling it and productive units are formed. (Author/RM)

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Toward a Peace Platform
for the 1980's

PEACE, SECURITY & THE 1980 ELECTIONS.

This statement offers a distinctive perspective in U.S. foreign policy in an election year.

IT FACES...
. the reality of Soviet military and political power.

. the terrorist threat to the foundations of diplomacy.

IT RECOGNIZES...
. the dangers of a renewed American military engagement and of American passivity.

IT OFFERS...
. a statement of the goals we should seek and a strategy for bringing adversary states into a common attempt to achieve them.

. specific acts to initiate progress toward these goals.

YOU COULD HELP MAKE IT
A FACTOR IN THE 1980
ELECTION DISCUSSION.

World Without War Issues Center-Midwest

SO 013 611

For some this statement will be too detailed.

Others will find it too simplistic.

Our intention is to engage thoughtful people now supporting increased U.S. military spending and those who do not in the development of an American peace initiatives strategy.

We ask:

1. Your support for the "general policy direction" presented in Part II.

2. Your judgement on the specific initiatives in Part IV.

3. Your ideas on additional initiatives that fit this policy framework.

We invite your response.

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PART I: REGAINING A COMMON SENSE OF PURPOSE AND DIRECTION

Needed—A Foreign Policy Adequate to the Challenge

The post-Vietnam era is over. What will be the character now of America's engagement in world affairs?

The 1980 Presidential election is taking place in a rapidly changing climate of public opinion. The United States lowered its profile in world politics in the post-Vietnam era. That posture is no longer acceptable. Starvation in Cambodia, terrorism in Iran, the Soviets in Afghanistan, high oil prices and rates of inflation—all underline an already changed public understanding: America is deeply affected by world politics. There is no safe way to ignore that reality. We have learned that the consequences of standing by while others determine the future can be as dangerous as the mistaken projection of American military power. We are ready again to define the character and goals of a necessary engagement.

The present moment offers both threats and promise.

The world an American President faces in the 1980's is full of both threat and promise:

- democracy is under attack throughout the world,
  - yet even totalitarian states evoke its form while robbing them of their substance.
- the Soviet Union has expanded its controls in many countries,
  - yet all but the Soviets' clients condemn its aggression in Afghanistan and slowly a more assertive domestic public has made its appearance in the Soviet Union.
- the world economy is very fragile,
  - but we have the resources and technological ability to eliminate desperate poverty from the earth.

The threat of armaments

Of all the threats that the President of the United States faces, none is more critical than that of armaments in the hands of adversary states. An international system in which each state's security depends on its own resolve to use military force is the single most ominous threat to the future. Yet given the present international system, nothing is politically more effective in advancing a nation's interest in world affairs than the credible threat to use military force. Understanding that, our leaders in the White House and Congress, with the support of the American public, are once again expanding our own military capability.

A Difference

The challenge of others' violence

One would expect this country to enlarge its military program in response to recent Soviet policy. That response, however delayed, was predictable. But the deliberate attempt to devise a series of non-military sanctions and inducements to gain Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan points to a new policy direction. In both Iran and Afghanistan our country did not accept others' use of violence. It did not respond militarily. Rather, leaders in our Administration developed a number of non-violent, coercive pressures designed to change an adversary's behavior. Some—the Olympic boycott for example—may have far reaching consequences in developing a changed response, both internally and in world politics, to Soviet policy.

Our response: Will the non-violent coercive pressures work?

These non-violent initiatives were not the result of a carefully developed long-term strategy. They were *ad hoc* measures hastily developed in response to a specific crisis. They have not and probably

will not succeed. We live in a world in which the final determinants are 115,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan and rifles and mines in the hands of political militants.

Are there ways the U.S. could take the lead in a long-term strategy?

But what of a long term strategy of non-violent initiatives for changing that world? Are there ways our country could take the lead in developing legal and political processes to replace violence? Are there coercive initiatives capable of influencing political leaders who now block the way?

A strategy that can open progress toward a world that resolves conflict without mass violence

"Peace, Security and the Elections" is an attempt to introduce that concept of a long-term American initiatives strategy into the 1980 election discussions. It differs from previous Carter Administration arms control, arms transfer and human rights strategies in that it is based on a far more sober estimate of Soviet and world realities. It combines cooperative and coercive acts. It is a strategy that can be supported by those now calling for an increase in U.S. military expenditures as well as by those opposing them. It is a strategy which offers the best hope of opening progress toward a world that resolves international conflict without mass violence.

Conditions for Success

Current policy reflects the fragmentation of public opinion. A formed public will is the key to pursuing clear policy objectives. You can help by testing Presidential and Congressional candidates for public office on the goals set forth below and on the specific proposals for advancing them.

A feasible goal

Our immediate goal cannot be harmony. We live in a world of conflict. What we can hope to achieve is a world in which conflicts are conducted and resolved without the organized mass violence of war. Such a world will not be achieved easily or quickly. But defining the conditions essential to a warless world, committing ourselves to them, and initiating steps toward them opens the possibility of gaining the needed response of others.

A joint undertaking

Another condition for success is increasing the cooperation of Allies. Continuity in our foreign policy will help. So will a positive sense of direction, and action on behalf of goals which are in the interest of everyone, as well as clear punitive initiatives when they are needed.

The hard facts of Soviet capability and policy

Today the essential condition for success is change in and agreement with the Soviet Union. Without such change, the goals we advocate will be abandoned when they encounter the hard facts of Soviet capability and policy. The course offered here recognizes that reality and acts to support needed incentives for change among allies, the non-aligned, and those in the Soviet Union most open to new directions.

Change is certain: to what is not.

Is change possible within the Soviet Union? That change will come is the one certainty. The problem is the nature and direction of that change. Whatever we do will surely affect Soviet policy. American passivity has its effects. Military responses have theirs. In the Soviet Union, contending groups now seek influence in the struggle to succeed President Brezhnev. What persistent, long-term American strategy is most likely to induce the changes essential to peaceful competition, in a world capable of resolving conflict without mass violence?

We believe the development of a peace initiatives strategy, like that outlined below, offers the most hope. We offer it as a step toward a peace platform for the 1980's.

PART II: LONG RANGE GOALS

A peace platform for the 1980's must state the goals essential to a warless world. It must then show how such goals can be realistically pursued in the present. Those goals are:

Can a political process be created to resolve crises?

1. *Mediating Regional and National Crises*

Afghanistan, Cambodia, and El Salvador are countries in which military conflicts threaten or exist and in which a political process should be substituted for arms to decide who should rule. The partial success in Zimbabwe suggests that mediation and political solutions are possible. Our objective should be to institutionalize that capability and make it generally available and preferred.

Can arms control and disarmament be achieved?

2. *Gaining Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*

The reality today is not arms control but nuclear and conventional arms build-ups. The SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) process has been paralleled by an expansion, not a limitation, of strategic nuclear armaments. The attempt to limit arms through concentrating on one weapon or class of weapons has also failed. New countries may soon go nuclear. Conventional arms transfers and conventional weapons build-ups are evident nearly everywhere. Devising realistic strategies for mutually scaling down nuclear and conventional armaments is the immediate goal. The eventual achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international controls is a primary requisite of a world without war.

Can the need for responsive international institutions be met?

3. *Strengthening International Institutions*

Existing international institutions sometimes help states clarify their goals, undertake common commitments and resolve conflicts. They also sometimes aid one state or bloc of states advance their ends in world political struggle. Thus, the automatic strengthening of existing international institutions is not desirable, the reform or creation of institutions in which all factions have a stake but none dominate more accurately defines what is needed. The goal of achieving responsive international institutions is a necessary corollary of achieving the goal of a disarmed world.

Should a sense of world community be added to our commitment to America?

4. *Building a sense of world community.*

Our political traditions suggest that law and political processes are ineffective unless they are rooted in consent. Building a sense of world political community through effective enforcement of internationally recognized human rights, through conflict-resolution procedures, through communications and exchange, and through common problem-solving is a necessary precondition to law as the alternative to war or the threat of war. Developing a sense of responsibility to the nascent world political community should complement, not replace, responsibility to the American political community.

How can the daily death toll from grinding poverty be ended?

5. *Sustaining World Economic Development*

Disarmament, international law, and a sense of world community are of little interest to those for whom the most pressing issue is release from grinding poverty. American development policy must work both at eradicating desperate poverty and at giving developing countries a stake in a nascent world political community.

These five goals constitute the objectives our foreign policy should seek. The five goals are interrelated: progress toward one makes progress toward the others more likely. They are not utopian goals. Similar

objectives *have* been achieved *within* many states today. They exist within the United States. Their achievement in world politics would leave many other problems unresolved but the resources, institutions and will to address these problems could more easily be gathered without the pervasive threat of war.

How can we move toward agreement on these goals in the world arena and within our own country? Can they be advanced in ways which bring adversary nations into agreement on needed steps toward their achievement? Is their pursuit a necessary instrument in the security policy of our country?

PART III: BY WHAT MEANS?

Facilitating negotiations by independent peace initiatives

There are many specific steps this country could take toward these five goals today. Negotiations are the usual method of pursuing such goals. But negotiations often fail. Taken outside of negotiations, peace initiatives can alter the climate or change the influences at work on decision-makers to make negotiated agreements more likely. In considering peace initiatives, it is important to select those acts which offer the best prospect for inducing others to reciprocate. The inducement may be that of good example—since they have changed their policy, so can we. It may be that the course offers mutual advantages, opening possibilities which before were closed. It may also be coercive —the failure to reciprocate will entail a loss of prestige, influence or resources.

Non-military steps designed to induce reciprocation

The word "initiative" has been badly abused in recent political discourse; it has become almost synonymous with any action taken outside of negotiations and some within. We mean it in a specific and limited sense: a peace initiative is a non-military action undertaken independently but designed to induce reciprocation from others and advance us toward the goals above.

A Peace Initiatives Strategy

In themselves, there is nothing new about initiatives. Even so minor a gesture as the Chinese admission of the U.S. Ping Pong team indicated an intention to pursue a new relationship. President Kennedy announced an independent American cessation of atmospheric testing as an inducement to gain Soviet cessation and negotiated agreement on the Partial Test-Ban Treaty.

Toward a new, persistent, policy of initiative action aimed at achieving interrelated goals

What *would* be new would be a persistent policy of initiative action undertaken in pursuit of the interrelated goals above. Its policy objective would be a world in which conflict is resolved through political and legal processes. Such a policy entails a planned series of initiative acts, not isolated gestures. The first peace initiatives may, of necessity, be modest. They may only clarify our intention to move toward the stated goals. As these initiatives are taken and reciprocated, more dramatic initiatives may be feasible. It is a fully developed strategy that can produce the leverage needed.

PART IV: SPECIFIC PROPOSALS

GOAL I: MEDIATING REGIONAL AND NATIONAL CRISIS

Wars now threaten or exist within countries or regions

Civil wars and regional wars (often fought with external help or influence) are the principal examples of mass, organized violence in world politics today. Over 150 of these wars have occurred since 1945, and, at present, such wars are underway in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Namibia, Chad, and El Salvador. The Middle East remains a tinderbox, even as its political and economic importance increases. Disintegrating states in Southwest Asia may provide the next example of regional or national conflicts with global implications and dangers.

Essential requirements for resolving regional crises

Whatever intermediaries seem most effective in a given situation [in some circumstances, regional organizations such as the OAS (Organization of American States) or the OAU (Organization of African Unity) are most appropriate, in others, a single nation, e.g. the United Kingdom in Zimbabwe, the United States in the Sinai, can be effective,] there are six essential requirements for establishing peace in the midst of such conflicts:

1) *preventing arms imports* into the crisis area or country;
2) achieving and policing a *cease-fire*;
3) providing *relief assistance* to the victims of the conflict;
4) establishing a *political process* to decide who shall rule;
5) protecting the *rights of those who lose* in the first election, through a continued international presence;
6) *economic and other assistance* in developing mutually beneficial economic projects that foster cooperation among the antagonists.

The United States could initiate progress toward these objectives by:

Regional Crisis Mediation Teams

1. Appropriating 25% of the funds and providing 25% of the logistical support needed to aid in the creation of regional mediation teams. Authorization should be sought from a regional organization, from the U.N., from willing states in the region, or finally from like-minded states to establish such mediation/peacekeeping forces in Cambodia, Afghanistan, the Middle East, Namibia, Ethiopia, Chad, and El Salvador.

Tested in El Salvador

2. Through the peace-keeping procedures of the Organization of American States (OAS), the U.S. should seek to establish a mediation/peacekeeping force in El Salvador. Observers from other, similar forces should be invited to participate.

Afghanistan & Cambodia

3. If mediation/peacekeeping forces are not accepted by the belligerents in other regions, particularly in Afghanistan and Cambodia, regional teams should establish themselves in adjacent countries, from which they would monitor the conflict, build communications links to the belligerents, and publicize, through regional and global international organizations their availability for ending each conflict without war.

Institutionalized

4. To help institutionalize this process, the U.S. should use private organizations'(e.g. the International Peace Academy) existing resources while instituting specialization in mediation/peacekeeping at the service academies and at the Peace Academy (when established), and request that the U.N. University (Tokyo) and other national military training institutions develop similar conflict-resolution skills for future military leaders.

Forecasting Conflict

5. The U.S. should ask that U.N. personnel doing functional tasks in conflict prone areas, also be trained in conflict mediation skills. The

purpose of their assignment would thus be expanded to include development of local contacts capable of adequately assessing potential conflict situations, while carrying out their functional tasks.

Punitive but not self-serving initiatives

If these intention-clarifying and mutual-example peace initiatives fail to gain the necessary response, the United States should, with other like-minded states, consider what other non-military but punitive actions might induce the needed response. Among the coercive initiatives that should be considered are suspension from international organizations (both political and financial); trade embargoes; and intense publicity of non-compliance. Such initiatives should be aimed at specific objectives, limited in duration, and not beneficial to the initiating power. If economic assistance is withheld, for example, it should be placed in a regional development bank until it can be used for the purpose originally intended.

GOAL II: GAINING ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS

World military spending now exceeds $450 billion per year. That level of military spending is inherently dangerous. Both nuclear and conventional war threaten every country in the world. Such spending both reflects existing conflicts and helps make them worse, yet, in some cases, prevents war.

Deterrence is in danger of failing

In times of rapid technological innovation, security based on armaments is particularly dangerous. If a technological break-through occurs, one side may no longer successfully deter the other. Deterrence requires mutual assured destruction. It can fail to deter if one side acquires either an adequate defense or an offense capable of eliminating the others forces. It can fail today if the research the United States and the Soviet Union are now doing on laser technology actually provides an effective defense against missiles or if sufficient counterforce weapons are deployed.

Recommended U.S. arms control and disarmament initiatives

Negotiations designed to limit armaments have failed to halt the overall expansion of arms. Further negotiations *and* independent peace initiatives outside of negotiations are needed. While initiatives can and should be carried out in many areas of the arms race, we wish to highlight the following:

Strategic Armaments

1. The negotiating process which led to the SALT I and SALT II agreements is a valuable resource. The problem is how to make the process actually limit arms. To this end the President should resubmit the SALT II Treaty for ratification. The Senate should ratify it without amendments but add this understanding: the United States will consider the protocol "which calls on the parties to agree upon significant and substantial reductions," as integral to the Treaty. Accordingly, the U.S. will not consider itself bound by the Treaty after two years if such reductions have not been negotiated within that time. Further, any Soviet weapons development that violated the spirit of SALT II or Soviet failing to negotiate SALT III in good faith would increase the incentive to abrogate the Treaty.

To demonstrate the urgent need for strategic arms reductions, the U.S. will independently suspend testing of new strategic weapons systems for one year and continue to do so if the Soviet Union reciprocates.

Standardized Budget & Military Accounting System

2. The U.S. should use, and negotiate agreement with allies to use, the standardized accounting system developed by a United Nations team to report and measure military budgets. A similar standardized system should also be developed to report current force levels. After the system is used by the U.S. for one year, the results should be published and international inspection teams invited to verify its accuracy. The U.S. should then announce the system will be utilized a second year if the Soviet Union permits similar inspection.

From military to peacekeeping and economic development expenditures

3. On the basis of this accounting system, the U.S. should set aside 1% of the defense budget for international peacekeeping, and if other countries adopt a similar procedure, set aside an additional 1% for development assistance over and above other aid for countries whose defense spending is less than 3% of GNP (Gross National Product).

From Non-Proliferation to a GCD Plan

4. As part of its commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States should revise and recommit itself to a negotiating plan for general and complete disarmament (GCD)—similar to the commitment and plan adopted by the U.S. in 1962. To indicate its

sincerity in gaining agreement on a revised GCD plan the U.S. should:

a. ratify Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelalco (prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America) which requires the U.S. and other signatories not to contribute to acts violating the treaty or to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties to the treaty.

b. seek agreement through the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to establish Africa as a nuclear-free zone. At an appropriate time during the negotiations, the U.S. should announce that it will act as if such an agreement existed and will continue to do so if other nuclear weapons states announce similar commitments.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban

5. To initiate steps toward a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the U.S. should announce a cessation of nuclear tests and continue to refrain from testing provided the Soviet Union reciprocates. If the Soviet Union tests, their tests should be matched only on a one for one basis.

The U.S. should also seek a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, within three years for nuclear weapons states, within five years for others.

Mutual Balanced Force Reductions in Europe

6. As an indication of its willingness to move the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks out of their present impasse, the U.S. should seek the agreement of its NATO allies to reduce tactical nuclear weapons by an equivalent percentage of the recent, very modest Soviet offer of a reduction in their overwhelming tank superiority.

Sustaining momentum toward disarmament goals

These measures, if they are reciprocated, would build momentum toward disarmament goals which would, we believe, make the reduction of conventional armaments more likely. In addition, such steps could help create a climate in which 5 to 10% reduction of forces or of military budgets (as accounted for by the standardized systems recommended in No. 2 above) could be initiated, reciprocated, and verified. This could, in turn, lead to a second 5 to 10% reduction and so on.

GOAL III: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

The U.S. has used the World Court as well as the Security Council and General Assembly to press for release of the hostages in Iran and to condem the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In these two cases, significant support for international law was achieved, effective enforcement was not.

Existing international organizations

The United Nations has accomplished much in resolving social and economic problems. Its functional agencies continue to work on problems of world hunger, environmental deterioration and health care. It has had some successes in peacekeeping (e.g. Cyprus, Kashmir). These accomplishments should be built upon.

In the 1980's the U.N. will remain a critical forum for clarifying national intentions, for building international consensus and, in some cases, for expanding international law (as for example, through the Law of the Sea Conference).

The United States should use the U.N. as an arena of first resort in resolving conflicts and in achieving change. In addition, the U.S. should seek to strengthen both the U.N. and other international legal and political institutions. Among the many possible initiatives to begin progress toward this objective, we recommend the following:

Coordinating Non-Military Sanctions

1. Develop within the United Nations an effective, international, Non-military Sanctions Coordinating Committee on a formal basis if possible, on an *ad hoc* basis if not. The first task of the committee should be to coordinate non-military sanctions and inducements to gain Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Law of the Sea

2. To clarify its intention to complete successfully the decade old Law of the Sea negotiations, the U.S. should collect royalties from U.S. enterprises now mining sea bed resources and place them in the World Bank's loan accounts, either until the Law of the Sea Conference completes its work or indefinitely if Japan and the Soviet Union reciprocate.

Surcharge on Conventional Weapons provide U.N. Revenue

3. To provide the U.N. with an independent source of revenue, the U.S. should impose a 10% surcharge on all conventional armaments transferred from it to other countries for one year, and agree to continue the surcharge if other arms exporting countries collect similar surcharges and permit international inspection.

U.N. Satellite System

4. Contribute one-half of the equipment and one-fourth of the cost of a U.N. satellite surveillance system with the capability of:

a. supplementing the information available to the United Nations Environment Program's worldwide surveillance system (Earthwatch).

b. providing information on military armaments and troop movements to the United Nations Disarmament Centre.

Conscription

5. Congress is considering appropriations for a new draft registration program.

The President should announce before the United Nations that this country is reluctantly taking this first step toward reentering the ranks of countries with military conscription. His judgment is that in a world political system of adversarial states, other countries with as much as three years or more of compulsory military service, have distinctive advantages in their war-making capability. The pressures on our own country to follow suit are enormous. This country's leaders may decide to reintroduce conscription but would prefer to end it on a world-wide basis. To this latter end, the United States should propose the following

five-point program to move us toward a world which no longer conscript individuals for military service:

Annual World Survey of Conscription circumstances

a. The U.N. Disarmament Center should monitor and publish each year a comparative survey of military service—years of and conditions of service, exemptions—in each country to establish the present level of conscription in the world.

Limits to length of service, reduce to zero

b. The U.N. should set the goal of shortening the term of service required in each country.

Recognize Conscientious Objection

c. Every state should recognize conscientious objection to military service.

The U.S. should recognize conscientious objection and open opportunities for alternative service to the country.

Transnational Conscientious Objectors Corps

d. A transnational program in which conscientious objectors can work should be created.

The U.S. should permit its conscientious objectors to do alternative service through such a transnational program.

Limits to use of conscripts

e. Negotiated limits on the military use of conscripts should be established.

The U.S. should stand ready to open negotiations.

GOAL IV: STRENGTHENING A SENSE OF WORLD COMMUNITY

Recommended U.S. initiatives

A sense of world community is strengthened when world political processes define and enforce human rights; it is weakened and destroyed when non-violent political opponents are tortured or murdered in any country.

A political obligation to more than our national community?

A sense of community is strengthened as agreed-to rules of international diplomacy and conflict mediation/resolution are followed; it is weakened and destroyed by governmentally authorized terrorist actions or terror employed by those who seek to form states or to seize power.

Recommended U.S. initiatives to strengthen a sense of world community

A sense of community is strengthened as one country initiates progress toward the goals outlined here, and as other countries indicate by their reciprocation that at times the national self-interest and the world interest are identical.

To be credible and to overcome suspicion, statements of intention must be matched with deeds. To aid in building a sense of world community, the United States should:

Refugees

1. Agree to accept as immigrants those Indochinese refugees, now languishing in camps, who desire to come here and who are not pledged by other countries.

To aid Cuban refugees, and refugees in general, the U.S. should seek the establishment of sanctuaries under U.N. auspices in every region of the world. To initiate progress toward the creation of such sanctuaries the U.S. should seek to make Belize or other nearby area a sanctuary.

In addition, the U.S. should ask the establishment of a U.N. Commission on Emigration empowered to investigate human rights violations and to propose remedies in any country producing more than 5,000 claiming human rights violation emigrants per year.

Human Rights

2. Ratify the two U.N. Covenants on Human Rights and the Conventions on Genocide and Racial Discrimination (with such reservations and understandings as are necessary to preserve the provisions of the Bill of Rights).

Following ratification the U.S. should ask that a Soviet team investigate racial discrimination in the United States while an American team investigates religious discrimination in the Soviet Union with each country agreeing that the reports, along with governmental and non-governmental responses, be published in major national news media.

Self-Determination and terrorism

3. Seek agreement by states to punish terrorist activity. Individuals engaged in terrorist activity can best be stopped through the use of existing criminal procedures. The example of airline pilots in refusing to fly to countries which routinely accepted and refused extradition of airline hijackers should be followed for other forms of terrorist activity.

Much of the terrorist activity in world politics, however, is sponsored by groups claiming they have been denied the right of self-determination (such as South Moluccans, Kurds, Palestinians, and Eritreans). The procedures outlined under Goal I also provide a means to test some such claims. Others need to be developed.

Governmentally-authorized or trained terrorist activities pose a third problem. To limit this form of terror the U.S. should:

a. reject clandestine terror itself or the export of items known to be used for terrorist purposes.

To combat governmentally authorized terrorism

b. indicate that the diplomats of any government which authorize terror against American diplomats will be placed under house arrest or deported unless U.S. hostages are released.

c. announce that governments training terrorists will be subject to economic sanctions such as trade embargoes, rejection of credit or the use of airport and seaport facilities.

d. permit its citizens to be tried for terrorist activities in any country which agrees to procedures assuring a fair trial; if there is substantial doubt that a fair trial can be achieved, an international criminal court should be established specifically for the purpose of hearing cases involving terrorism.

We should invite other countries to join in these initiatives.

Non-Western News Media

4. The U.S. should provide training stipends and consulting services for members of non-Western news agencies such as the Press Institute of India, the Press Foundation of Asia, the Caribbean News Agency and the African News Agency now being formed. Private individuals and organizations should ask U.S. news media to utilize the non-governmentally controlled releases and services of such agencies and occasionally provide parallel news and interpretative articles from non-Western and Western sources.

The U.S. media can help give increased attention to information obtained from sources not controlled by governments, and should occasionally provide broadcast facilities to democratic opponents of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes to offset the monopoly on news such regimes seek.

Visa for Friends and Foes

5. As evidence of its compliance with Basket III of the Helsinki Accords, the U.S. should seek ways to shorten the waiting period for U.S. visas and simplify the application forms. Members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union should be admitted on an exchange basis with Soviet dissidents who want to visit their homeland as a step toward freer travel.

Basic Human Rights

6. Encourage non-state actors (e.g. the International Commission of Jurists or Amnesty International) to form fact-finding teams and through them to set up international criminal courts to establish regional forums for victims of human rights violations and their advocates.

The following violations of basic human rights should justify international action to verify the violation and to redress it: 1) torture; 2) arbitrary arrest; 3) religious liberty violations; 4) murder of non-violent political opponents; 5) forceful breaking-up of families and 6) refusal to permit emigration.

The U.S. should provide access to an Organization of American States Court or other international tribunal for any citizen of the U.S. claiming the basic rights above have been violated provided the Judges of that tribunal are from countries adopting similar procedures.

GOAL V: SUSTAINING WORLD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Up to 3½ million people die each day from diseases related to malnutrition

The famine in Cambodia, the Presidential Commission Report on Hunger and the Brandt Commission Report have each dramatized the problem of world hunger and world economic development. About one billion of the earth's four billion people now live in conditions of "desperate poverty". The once widely shared belief that eliminating hunger was easy has now been shattered. Hunger persists despite a $10.8 billion food stamp program in the United States. Massive hunger of a far worse nature and of far greater extent has recently been acknowledged by the post-Maoist leadership in China and by Castro and Cuban refugees.

Recommended U.S. initiatives to end desperate poverty

The urgent first problem is to reach the millions who live in desperate poverty. This problem should be approached on an humanitarian basis which seeks to limit the role ideological, power, and national interest play in such efforts. To help achieve the goal of eliminating desperate poverty the U.S. should:

Grain Reserve

1. Transfer the grain withheld from shipment to the Soviet Union to the world grain reserve under the auspices of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) on the condition that it be distributed through the on-going world food program. Such transfer should continue if its use is combined with research and projects in recipient countries which help make them self-sufficient in food.

Hunger Early Warning & Relief System

2. Agree to accept the FAO's "Global Information and Early Warning System" on hunger as an indication of where aid is required. The U.S. should then contribute one-fourth of the requirement of aid to meet such needs in 1981; and should agree to automatically continue on an annual basis if Western industrialized countries, the OPEC countries and the Soviet Union each agree to contribute one-fourth of needed resources.

Are the rules and processes of world economic transactions fair?

The second world economic development problem involves changes in the goals and rules of economic transactions. How, for example, should the price of energy imports and industrial exports be determined? What should be the rules of trade? On what should international monetary exchange be based? These problems are complex and circumstances are constantly changing. For example, the third level of oil import price increases (roughly from $18 per barrel in 1979 to $35 per barrel in 1980) has deeply damaged industrialized economics and has proved catastrophic to non-oil exporting economies of developing states.

Recommended U.S. initiatives

More equitable world economic transactions require changes in the industrialized market countries, in the oil exporting countries and in the developing countries. Negotiations concerning what changes need to be made by whom must continue in a variety of international and bilateral forums. The industrialized states should offer concrete proposals in these forums.

To aid in sustaining world economic development, the U.S. should:

Reduce Oil Imports

1. Reduce oil imports further.

The reductions of last year (1979) are a start but further reductions are needed to demonstrate to allies that the possible costs of sanctions against Iran will be borne equitably and to gain some leverage over continued price increases.

7/10th of 1% of GNP for aid if. . .

2. Establish a standardized accounting system for aid transfers including governmental and non-governmental aid. If the total aid transfer is less than the U.N. goal of 7/10th of 1% of GNP, the additional amount should be contributed to multilateral aid programs. The U.S. should be

willing to continue this indefinitely if OPEC countries, the Soviet Union and other industrialized countries contribute to multilateral aid programs and developing countries demonstrate they can efficiently utilize contributed aid.

Land Reform

3. Appropriate or ear-mark 1/2 of the needed funds for a country's land reform program provided the land goes to those tilling it and productive units are formed.

CONCLUSION

One country can lead without unacceptable risks

The goals offered here and the proposals designed to initiate progress toward them indicate how one country can begin progress toward a world which resolves international conflict without mass violence. We have defined the goals which, if achieved, would make that kind of world possible. We have indicated how the United States, without unacceptable danger to our own political community, could be that country.

Applying democratic and moral values to world political conflict

At the center of this view of America's role in world politics is a commitment to democratic values. Given the increasing interdependence of the world community, and the promise and threats that result, we can count on intense conflict in world politics. Given the ideological, economic, cultural and religious differences, we could be overwhelmed by chaos if not by conflict. Our democratic and religious values and our own experience in establishing political community lead us to try to create in world affairs political processes capable of ordering chaos. That means seeking the conditions in world politics in which conducting and resolving conflict without violence is the norm.

Initial costs, and benefits

We are aware that many of these proposals cost money. The total could run as high as $50 billion. Such expenditures offer one, but not the only, way to demonstrate an intention to pursue new goals. The costs may be saved in reduction of military spending, in oil import price decreases (or cash outlays for oil not consumed) or as aid opens the possibility of mutually beneficial trade relations. Most of the proposals quickly move toward equitable sharing of the costs. Peace, no less than war, may require sacrifice.

To challenge citizens and candidates

Although presented to candidates for public office, this statement is intended as well for this country's citizens. Citizens must identify the ideas, the values and the sense of direction which would permit this country to pursue constructively the goals outlined in this statement. If you are in agreement with the "general policy direction" outlined here we would like to include your name among the endorsers of this statement. Your suggestion of additional initiatives which fit the policy framework described herein will help make this a major step toward the peace initiative strategy needed in the 1980's.

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